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INTRODUCTIONR ule 25 of the 1912 Equity Rules stated that "it shall be sufficient
that a bill in equity shall contain ... a short and simple statement
of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any
mere statement of evidence." Not mere conclusions, not evidence,
but "ultimate facts." And, at that, not facts "constituting the cause of
action."
The bare words of Rule 25 could mean something quite different to
a twenty-first-century audience than they meant to a twentieth-century
audience. But they may serve as a foil to the challenge framed by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal2 for the committees that advise the Judicial Conference, and
thence the Court, on the Court's discharge of its responsibilities under
3the Rules Enabling Act. In those cases, the Court relied on an
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." Any response to the challenge of drafting a
pleading must begin by determining whether there is any reason to
respond at all by recommending revisions of Rule 8(a)(2) or any other
Rule of Civil Procedure. The Court did not suggest any reason to
reconsider Rule 8(a)(2). But the deluge of academic commentary
stimulated by the Court's opinions reflects deep concern that the
Court has set lower courts on a path that will lead to improvident
dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Professor Arthur R. Miller's article, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,4 is a masterful expression of these concerns. '
This Article is framed as an appreciation of Professor Miller's
direct excoriation of Twombly and Iqbal and his straight-on assertion
that something must be done to reset pleading standards, whether by
1 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075 (2006).
4 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).
5 One illustration of this article's influence can be found in Judge Hamilton's dissent in
McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL 4975644, at *23 (7th Cir. Oct. 20,
2011).
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the Court itself with the advice of its advisory committees or by
Congress.- His article is a massive demonstration of the qualities that
put him at the front of civil procedure scholarship. By no means is it
an exercise in nostalgia for the simpler world that greeted the Federal
6Rules of Civil Procedure on their birth in 1938. Nor does he mince
words. Professor Miller sees Twombly and Iqbal, together, as part of
a steady march toward "efficient" disposition by sacrificing the merits
to avoid trial and as a retreat from protecting individual rights in favor
of concentrated wealth.7 He evokes action by the rules committees to
restore the power of civil procedure to protect individual rights and
8
enforce broad public policies.
If the Rules Advisory Committee embraces Professor Miller's
concerns, the challenge will be to draft rules that restore, directly or
indirectly, the opportunities that "notice pleading" afforded before
May 21, 2007, the date of the Twombly decision.9 It is also possible,
on the other hand, that the Court got it right, and that lower courts
have wisely developed the opportunities opened by the Court.
Pleading standards have continued to evolve in practice in ways that
6 "Much . . has changed in the world of litigation .... The cultures of the law and of
the legal profession are far different.... And litigation in the federal courts has become a
world unimagined in 1938 .. . . The pretrial process has become so elaborate . . . that it
often seems to have fallen into the hands of some systemic Sorcerer's Apprentice. . . .
Sadly, in some respects today's civil litigation is neither civil nor litigation as previously
known." Miller, supra note 4, at 7-9.
7 The decisions "should be seen as the latest steps in a long-term trend that has favored
increasingly early case disposition in the name of efficiency, economy, and avoidance of
abusive and meritless lawsuits. It also marks a continued retreat from the principles of
citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant treatment in
favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth." Id. at 10.
8 The divide between plaintiffs and defendants on pleading standards "even may imperil
the credibility and effectiveness of the rulemaking process as rulemakers try to chart a path
from this point." Id. at 16. "[T]he Federal Rules-indeed, federal civil practice in
general-stand at a critical crossroads. It is incumbent upon the courts and rulemakers to
consider the full range of important questions and policy choices that have surfaced not
just in Twombly and Iqbal, but as a result of the overarching trend toward pretrial
disposition." Id. at 17. Professor Miller throws down the gauntlet in a clear challenge to
the Advisory Committee: "Considering the Court's current ideological makeup and the
continuing trend toward increasingly early case disposition, rulemaking by judicial
mandate does not bode well for many of those policies that are furthered by private
enforcement and the access principle. The members of the Advisory Committee therefore
must determine whether they will reassert their role as independent architects of the
Federal Rules, accept that an aspect of their responsibility now may be to codify the
Court's Federal Rule decisions, or simply remain silent and defer to case development."
Id. at 87.
9 That is the approach of proposed legislation, the Notice Pleading Restoration Act
described infra note 57.
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may restore greater uniformity, at lower thresholds, than resulted in
the early years as hundreds of district court judges sought to work
through the uncertainties opened by the Court's opinions. The
steadying perspective of appellate judges can balance the initial
enthusiasm of some trial judges for practices that free time for
obviously substantial cases by sacrificing cases that seem
insubstantial. If courts come to get it right, the challenge will be to
decide whether there is any occasion to amend the rules at all, and if
so whether Rule 8(a)(2) should be amended-perhaps along lines
similar to Equity Rule 25-to better express the new approach. For
that matter, it is possible that, constrained by unchanged rule
language, the Court, as understood by the lower courts, did not go far
enough. Drafting still more demanding pleading standards would be
a drafting challenge of a different order.
No purpose would be served by adding to the countless summaries
of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions that grace the law reviews and
court reports. Anyone reading these comments is thoroughly familiar
with them. Professor Miller's article provides a comprehensive
account of the cases and commentary over the first three years and
more following Twombly, and more than a year following Iqbal.
What follows is a series of reflections on the responsibility of the
rules committees to consider all major gradations of pleading
standards and possible direct ties of discovery to pleading
requirements. Committee work in all things is deliberate. Apart from
the most obvious technical changes, it takes at least three years to
move from an idea to an adopted amendment. More important or
difficult topics take longer, often much longer. And even the starting
point may be deferred when, as with pleading, practice continues to
develop and painstaking empirical work is progressing. Illustrations
are drawn from ongoing Advisory Committee work, with two
cautions. The illustrations are only that, pictures drawn from a larger
body of Committee materials. And none has been the subject of the
intense Committee deliberations that will occur if-it is not certainly
"when"-the Committee concludes the time has come to work on
specific proposals. Nothing in what follows can be taken as even a
hint of possible Committee recommendations.
The principal themes are easily summarized. The Twombly and
Iqbal opinions reveal the Court's hope that something good may be
achieved by increasing the opportunity to dismiss litigation at the
pleading stage. The opinions do not give any precise guidance toward
realizing the hope. Instead, they have encouraged lower courts to
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engage in a common-law process that, by fits and starts, is working
toward new practices. Litigants have presented many motions that
speed the evolutionary process, but evolution continues. When some
measure of stability is achieved, it will remain to be determined what
to make of it all. That determination will not be easy. Counting the
rate and numbers of dismissals is only a beginning. The hard part will
be reaching judgments about the desirability of the new practices, if
indeed the new practices become firmly established.
The most common belief-to many, the fear-is that actions that
would not have been dismissed on the pleadings before Twombly and
Iqbal will be dismissed in the era of new pleading practices. Is any
increase undesirable? Is it possible that a still greater increase would
be desirable? Judgment requires a means of valuing the loss of claims
that would have succeeded if allowed to survive at the pleading stage,
values that involve both individual interests and broader social
interests in enforcing policies enshrined in substantive law. To many
observers, judgment also requires a means of valuing the impositions
on defendants who must litigate beyond the pleading stage, whether
to win on the merits or to settle on terms shaped by the uncertainty
and costs of continued litigation. Undertaking rules amendments
requires a reasonably secure judgment that things have gone wrong.
That may be some way off. If that judgment is reached, the next task
is to translate it into rule provisions that move practice in a better
direction. That may be the greatest challenge of all. The rules
committees may be pardoned for proceeding with self-conscious
deliberation.
I
CIVIL RULES COMMITTEE AGENDA BEFORE 2007
This account of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee's
consideration of pleading practice begins a bit more than two decades
ago. Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted were reconsidered as part of a
project to revise summary judgment practice under Rule 56, a project
that fell dormant for many years before it was revived to produce the
rewritten rule that became effective on December 1, 2010. There was
some early enthusiasm for a proposal that would abolish the 12(b)(6)
motion and also the Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The purpose was to "unifly] pleadings motion practice with summary
judgment practice." The motion could address the legal sufficiency
of a claim, with or without a challenge to the sufficiency of the
9592012]
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evidence to support a legally sufficient claim. The major difference
was that the nonmovant's opportunity for discovery before a ruling,
an established feature of summary judgment, would be expressly
confirmed for motions that challenge only the legal sufficiency of a
claim.1 o This proposal was dropped from the Rule 56 project before
the project was put aside for further work following rejection by the
Judicial Conference.
By 1993, the focus shifted from the question whether to add further
protections against dismissal for failure to state a claim. That was the
year the Supreme Court decided Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit."' The Court ruled that
"heightened pleading" could not be required for claims that a
municipal entity was liable for Fourth Amendment violations
committed by its employees and was separately liable for failing to
train its employees to avoid Fourth Amendment violations.12 The
Court reasoned that by specifying issues that must be pleaded with
particularity in Rules 9(b) and (c), the rules impliedly exclude any
other particularized pleading requirements.13 At the close, the Court
suggested that it might be that the Rules should be rewritten to subject
claims against municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "to the added
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation." 14
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee immediately took up the
invitation to consider specific pleading requirements. Given the
occasion, it should be no surprise that the Committee framed the
question in those terms: should heightened pleading be required,
either for specific categories of cases or in more general terms? By
the time of the Advisory Committee meeting in the fall of 1993, it
10 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE FEBRUARY
13-14, 1987, MEETING, at 138-44 (1987) (on file with author) (setting out the Rule 12
proposal).
11 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
12 Id. at 164.
13 The opinion might seem inconsistent on this rationale, because it left open the
possibility that "our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading
in cases involving individual government officials." Id. at 166-67. The inconsistency
could be explained away, however, by understanding this caveat to mean only that Rule
8(a)(2) would be satisfied by mere notice pleading but that the substantive imperative of
official immunity supersedes ordinary pleading rules.
14 Id. at 168.
15 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE MAY 3-5, 1993, MEETING,
at 17-18 (1993).
960 [Vol. 90, 955
HeinOnline  -- 90 Or. L. Rev. 960 2011-2012
King Arthur Confronts Twlqy Pleading
framed these questions in terms that anticipated part of the debates
that rage today.
The memorandum that framed the questions suggested that "the
required level of pleading specificity varies widely among different
types of litigation." 16  It found support both in academic
commentary' 7 and judicial observations.' It did not take a position
on this phenomenon. It made note of the argument that "it would be
virtually impossible for the rulemaking process to regularize the
process by which heightened pleading requirements are enforced."l 9
On the other hand, it observed that expanding the motion for a more
definite statement might, indeed, regularize the process; yet, "[o]ne
range of arguments surely will be that a seemingly neutral procedure
will in fact be used to dispose of disfavored claims by artificially
elevated pleading requirements." 2 0
After the 1993 memorandum, pleading reappeared on the Advisory
Committee agenda at irregular intervals. Some of the illustrative draft
rules are included in the survey of potential amendments set out in
Part IV. The last appearance before the Twombly decision came in
September 2006. This proposal suggested a number of alternative
ways to revise the Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement.
Three variations would have added authority to order a more definite
statement of a pleading-any pleading, not only "a pleading to which
a responsive pleading is required"-"if a more particular pleading
will support informed decision of a motion under subdivisions (b),
(c), (d), or (f)"; "will facilitate management of the action [under Rule
16]"; or "will enable the parties and the court to conduct and manage
discovery and to [present and] resolve dispositive motions."2 1 A
fourth variation was more direct: "[o]n motion or on its own, the court
16 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE OCTOBER 21-23,
1993, MEETING, at 196 (1993).
17 Id. (citing Richard L. Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986)).
18 Id. (quoting Judge Keeton, who served as Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure: "[S]pecificity requirements are not limited to cases decided
under Rule 9(b) or under Admiralty Rules C(2) and E(2)(a). Rather, the 'degree of
specificity with which the operative facts must be stated in the pleadings varies depending
on the case's context."' Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 866 (1st
Cir. 1993)).
19 Id. at 197.
20 Id. at 198.
21 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE SEPTEMBER 7-8,
2006, MEETING, at 294-96 (2006).
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may order amendment of a pleading to provide sufficient particularity
22to" achieve whichever of the three variations might be chosen.
Two of the illustrations of possible rules amendments may be
noted. Rule 8(a)(2) might be amended to require "a short and plain
statement of the claim in sufficient detail to showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief." What has become Rule 8(d)(1) might be
amended to read: "Each allegation must be simple, concise, and
direct. No technical form is required. The pleading as a whole must
be sufficient to support informed decision of a motion under Rules
12(b), (c), or (f."
Lawyers reacted favorably. Judges were concerned that Rule 12(e)
23
would become the basis for reflexive, "roadblock" motions. In
2005, the Advisory Committee summarized competing considerations
in terms that seemed to anticipate Twombly and Iqbal:
The wide variety of heightened pleading requirements that have
emerged in practice provides the foundation for a response to this
history. It may show that the collective wisdom of many judges,
growing over time, is better than the abstract passion for minined
pleading. Whatever may have been desirable in 1938 or 1948 is
no longer desirable. The burdens imposed by going to pretrial
stages beyond pleading continue to grow. As the law keeps
growing to regulate more and more human activities in increasingly
complex ways, so grows the opportunity to bring lawsuits founded
on theories that cannot withstand the light of full statement.
Pleading must be restored as a protection againsphe procedures that
help to prepare for trial or summary disposition.
22 Id. at 297.
23 The summary in the minutes provides greater detail:
[T]he judges seemed to be reflecting experiences different from the experiences
of the lawyers. The lawyers represented careful, thoughtful, desirable practice.
They can understand the potential good uses of case-specific pleading orders as
means to more efficient identification of the issues, control of discovery, and
perhaps resolution by dispositive motion. The judges confront lawyers who do
not practice to these standards, and fear misuses that will add to delay and
impose burdens on the court that are not sufficiently alleviated by simply
denying the ill-founded motions. The many tools available to shape discovery
and to manage an action more generally may counsel that nothing be done. The
idea still may deserve development, but great care will be required.
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE SEPTEMBER 7-8, 2006,
MEETING, at 24 (2006).
24 The bill of particulars was replaced by the Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite
statement in 1948.
25 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE OCTOBER 27-28,
2005, MEETING, at 390 (2005).
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The Committee carried the Rule 12(e) project forward, but the
Twombly and Iqbal opinions open questions that must be viewed from
broader perspectives. Now the Committee must consider many
alternatives, some competing and some mutually enforcing.
II
THE COURT SPEAKS
The two decades of Supreme Court pleading pronouncements
before the Twombly opinion provided uncertain guidance. Two
opinions stated clearly that outside Rule 9(b), Rule 8(a)(2) provides a
uniform standard that prohibits heightened pleading.26 At least three
others, and perhaps four, seemed to apply standards more demanding
27than elemental "notice" pleading.
26 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty.
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
27 Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416-18 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council
of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). The Crawford-El opinion is the most explicit. It
mingled two concerns: pleading a claim that "requires proof of wrongful motive" against a
public officer who may be able to invoke official immunity. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at
597. By ordering the plaintiff to reply to the answer, or by ordering a more definite
statement under Rule 12(e), "the court may insist that the plaintiff 'put forward specific,
nonconclusory factual allegations' that establish improper motive causing cognizable
injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment....
This option exists even if the official chooses not to plead the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity." Id. at 598.
In the Associated General Contractors case the Court assumed that the antitrust laws
might be violated by an agreement among construction contractors to coerce others to do
business with nonunion firms, weakening and restraining the trade of other firms.
Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 527-28. The Court added a footnote that may
be more interesting because the author was Justice Stevens, who dissented in Twombly:
Had the District Court required the Union to describe the nature of the alleged
coercion with particularity before ruling on the motion to dismiss, it might well
have been evident that no violation of law had been alleged. In making the
contrary assumption for purposes of our decision, we are perhaps stretching the
rule of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 . . . too far. Certainly in a case of
this magnitude, a district court must retain the power to insist upon some
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy
to proceed.
Id. at 528 n. 17 (ordering dismissal for want of antitrust standing).
The Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-48 (2005), ruled
that a complaint for securities fraud "failed adequately to allege" proximate cause and
economic loss. The Court invoked a passage from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957), that was quoted and preserved in the Twombly opinion: the "short and plain
statement" required by Rule 8(a)(2) "must provide the defendant with 'fair notice of what
the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at
346. But the complaint failed because it alleged only that the plaintiff bought stock at a
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Lower courts were similarly inconsistent. In 2004, Judge Posner
wrote that the Federal Rules replaced fact pleading with notice
pleading, forbidding any heightened pleading requirement that a
prisoner plaintiff "plead enough facts to show that it would be
worthwhile to put the defendants to the bother of answering the
complaint . . . [despite] the frivolousness of most of that [prisoner]
litigation."28 Other opinions, on the other hand, clearly required
29
exquisitely detailed pleading.
Then came Twombly, followed two years later by Iqbal. The Court
seemed concerned that the time had come to reorder the multiple
approaches reflected in its own opinions and the welter of approaches
taken in the lower courts. It is easy to explain away each case by
pointing to the special reasons that could have led the Court to want
to protect the defendants at the pleading stage. The concern in
Twombly was that it is easy to allege a horizontal conspiracy among
price inflated by the defendants' misrepresentations. Id. at 347-48. Paying an artificially
inflated price is not, the Court thought, "a relevant economic loss." Id. at 347. The
complaint did not provide "notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what
the causal connection might be between that loss and the misrepresentation[s]." Id. The
opinion blends substantive securities-law concepts with pleading requirements in a way
that defeats confident characterization, but it would be easy to conclude that it required a
heightened level of "notice" in response to the perceived needs of a particular class of
litigation.
28 Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970-71 (7th Cir. 2004).
29 Two wrenching examples illustrate this. First, the court in Rivera v. Rhode Island,
402 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2005), affirmed dismissal of a complaint alleging a substantive due
process violation based on a state-created risk. A murder suspect killed the plaintiffs
fifteen-year-old daughter after she agreed to appear as a witness against him. Id. at 30.
The complaint set out facts to support the theory that the defendants created the risk: they
persuaded the girl to be a witness, assured her she would be protected, compelled her to
confront the defendant in open court, failed to put her in a witness-protection program
although another child witness was placed in a program, and failed to react after repeated
notices of repeated explicit threats made to the child. Id. The court assumed that a claim
would be made if "the circumstances shock the conscience," id. at 36, but found the
pleading inadequate, id at 39. The most obvious explanation is that the court was intent
on severely limiting the state-created risk theory. It seems likely that many other courts
would have reached the same decision.
Second, the court in Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2005), affirmed dismissal of
a complaint brought on behalf of a mentally challenged eight-year-old boy who was
repeatedly sodomized and sexually molested by other residents of a state-run residential
facility where the state had placed him after he fell victim to sexual abuse by his father.
"Because of John's youth, limited cognitive abilities, and his emotional trauma from the
attacks, he is unable to provide details of the events or identify how the Defendants'
actions allowed the attacks to occur." Id. at 988. After rejecting dismissal on the basis of
heightened-pleading requirements, the court affirmed dismissal for failure to satisfy the
trial court's "reasonable orders to delineate Defendants and identify their respective acts or
omissions." Id. at 989.
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competitors or potential competitors, but it is difficult to prove
conspiracy either as a matter of explicit agreement or as a matter of
elusive concepts that seek to distinguish "conspiracy" from achieving
the same behavior by sophisticated calculation of move and possible
countermove in a concentrated market structure. The concern in
Iqbal was that the ease of alleging intent to discriminate was
supplemented by the manifest wish, reflected in official immunity
doctrine, to protect high-ranking public officials against the burdens
of litigation. But both in Twombly and in Iqbal the Court did not
restrict its opinions to those concerns. Instead, it wrote in general
terms about the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2).
The Court's explicit focus on the costs imposed by contemporary
discovery practices demonstrates the broad reach of both opinions.
The Court showed clear skepticism about the ability of trial court
judges to contain these costs by carefully managing discovery in a
process designed to elicit, at reasonable cost, information sufficient to
support a determination whether to end the case on a dispositive
motion or to advance to full-blown discovery. Repeated failure to
curtail runaway discovery costs, even if only in a small fraction of
cases at the top of the extensive discovery scale, suggested that the
time had come to explore reliance on pleadings motions as an
enhanced threshold for admission to the discovery process.
The opinions the Court wrote to express this concern are not
models of clarity. Understandably, in construing present Rule 8(a)(2)
the Court did not attempt to draft new rule text. Many terms might
characterize the Twombly opinion in this dimension. Not all are
flattering, but a sympathetic characterization is both possible and at
least close to the mark. The Court's vantage point at the top of the
federal court structure lends a perspective not always given to those
laboring in the trenches. It is easy to become accustomed to the
incredibly expensive discovery practiced in some cases, assuming it is
warranted by a deliberate choice to depend on discovery, not "notice"
pleadings, to determine what facts are available to support application
of a legal theory that is valid if, indeed, facts can be found to support
its application. The Court is not immersed in this practice on a daily
basis. It is easier for it to ask whether something can be done to
redress the balance, at least some of the time for some of the cases.
The Twombly opinion provides a rich smorgasbord of phrases that
courts may seize upon to support any of a wide range of pleading
regimes. They might require substantially heightened pleading across
9652012]
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the board, or nearly so.30 Or they might apply different pleading
standards to different categories of actions. Or, in the phrase from
Iqbal, they might apply ad hoc pleading standards, even within any
particular category of actions according to "judicial experience and
common sense."31
It would be easy to emerge from studying the Twombly opinion
uncertain, or even bewildered, as to what is intended. Uncertainty
seems the appropriate sense of it. But it is the Court's own
uncertainty. Hoping that something might be done through initial
evaluations at the pleading stage to advance the Rule I goals of "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination," the Court does not know just
what that something might be. Rather than attempt a firm answer, it
has invited the lower courts to carry on, more openly and more freely
than in the past, a common-law process of developing pleading
standards. This uncertainty, perhaps mixed with some ambivalence,
may be found in later opinions that seem to honor the pre-Twombly
44 32
"no heightened pleading" admonitions.
The lower courts have responded to the invitation. Initial reactions
diverged markedly, as might be expected. Five years is not yet
enough time to achieve stability, not even stability in settling on
different approaches in different circuits. But there is reason to think
that the process of sorting things out is proceeding at a sensible rate.
Certainly the courts have, from the beginning, devoted great energy
and care to the task.33  And some, after only a few years, have
30 The Twombly opinion said in a footnote that what then was the Form 9 complaint for
negligence, now Form 11, suffices. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10
(2007). There was little choice; Rule 84 says that the forms suffice under these rules. But
as noted in Part IV, the sufficiency of pleading negligence in an automobile accident does
not control the sufficiency of pleading negligence in other contexts.
31 Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
32 Pride of place is commonly given to Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007),
decided two weeks after Twombly, reversing on the certiorari papers the dismissal of a pro
se prisoner's complaint. The Court invoked its own earlier statements that a pro se
complaint is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. at 2200.
In Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), the Court cited the Swierkeiwicz decision,
see supra note 26 and accompanying text, and went on, "Rule 8(a)(2) . . . generally
requires only a plausible 'short and plain' statement of the plaintiffs claim, not an
exposition of his legal argument," Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1246.
33 Judge Newman's opinion in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub
nom. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, is a remarkable illustration of resourceful, sympathetic, and
understanding response within barely more than three weeks of the Twombly opinion. He
found that the opinion, through "several, not entirely consistent signals," indicated an
intent "to make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had prevailed in
the federal courts ever since Conley v. Gibson." Id. at 155. The "conflicting signals
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concluded that no more than modest changes have been made. 34  Of
course disagreements of expression remain and often reflect real
create some uncertainty as to the intended scope of the Court's decision." Id. at 157.
"[T]he Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is
instead requiring a flexible 'plausibility' standard, which obliges a pleader to amplify a
claim with some allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render
the claim plausible." Id. at 157-58.
34 The Seventh Circuit has provided many good opinions. Four, and a dissent in a fifth,
chosen almost at random, illustrate the point.
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), was, like lqbal, an action against a
cabinet member. The plaintiffs claimed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was
personally involved in and responsible for their unlawful imprisonment and torture in Iraq.
Id. at 594. But unlike Iqbal, they did not need to allege a purpose to discriminate. See id.
The court found adequately pleaded facts to support claims "that Secretary Rumsfeld acted
deliberately in authorizing interrogation techniques that amount to torture," and also
"deliberate indifference ... in failing to act to stop the torture of these detainees despite
actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse." Id. at 600. The complaint spread over 79
pages and 387 paragraphs. Id. at 595. The rules "impose no special pleading requirements
for Bivens claims, including those against former high-ranking government officials." Id.
at 600. The court rejected such arguments for the defendant as that allegations of
imprisonment in "extremely cold" cells lacked factual contekt, elaboration, or
comparisons, invoking the simplicity of Forms 10-15 mandated as sufficient by Rule 84.
Id. at 607.
In In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010), the court
began by explaining its decision to grant permission for an interlocutory appeal. There
was "a' question of the meaning of a common law doctrine-namely the federal common
law doctrine of pleading in complex cases." Id. at 626. "Pleading standards in federal
litigation are in ferment after Twombly and Iqbal," justifying permission to appeal. Id. at
627. In Iqbal, the Court said that the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability
requirement but demands more than a sheer possibility. Id. at 629.
This is a little unclear because plausibility, probability, and possibility overlap.
... [W]hat is plausible has a moderately high likelihood of occurring. The fact
that the allegations undergirding a claim could be true is no longer enough to
save a complaint from being dismissed; the complaint must establish a
nonnegligible probability that the claim is valid; but the probability need not be
as great as such terms as "preponderance of the evidence" connote.
Id.
Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010), was a claim for injury caused by
a hip replacement device manufactured in violation of federal law. In ruling that the
original complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court
quoted an earlier opinion: "As a general rule . . . notice pleading remains the standard."
Id. at 559 (quoting Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs.,
536 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2008)). And another: "We give the plaintiff 'the benefit of
imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint."' Id. (quoting
Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009)). The plaintiff
need not plead the precise defect or the specific federal regulatory requirements that were
allegedly violated. Id. at 560. "[Tlhe victim of a genuinely defective product ... may not
be able to determine without discovery and further investigation whether the problem is a
design problem or a manufacturing problem." Id. Making matters more difficult at the
pleading stage, much of the critical information is confidential as a matter of federal law.
Id. "An injured plaintiff cannot gain access to that information without discovery." Id.
9672012]
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Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010), was a divided decision.
Dismissal of a complaint alleging race discrimination in denial of a home-equity loan was
reversed. Id. at 407. Explaining Twombly and Iqbal, Judge Wood wrote for the majority,
As we understand it, the Court is saying . . . that the plaintiff must give enough
details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.
In other words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened, not did
they happen. For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff's
inferences seem more compelling than the opposing inferences.
Id. at 404. And the court's reliance on Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002),
"indicates that in many straightforward cases, it will not be any more difficult today for a
plaintiff to meet [the pleading] burden than it was before the Court's recent decisions."
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. Judge Posner dissented, emphasizing the burdens of discovery,
particularly when a plaintiff has little information to be discovered and can impose heavy
discovery burdens on a defendant who has extensive information. Id at 411. Twombly
and Iqbal were intended to create a greater symmetry of litigation costs. Id. at 412. But
"[i]f the plaintiff shows that he can't conduct an even minimally adequate investigation
without limited discovery, the judge presumably can allow that discovery, meanwhile
deferring ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.
Judge Hamilton wrote the court's opinion in Vance v. Rumsfeld, described above, and a
dissent in McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL 4975644 (7th Cir. Oct. 20,
2011). In McCauley, the plaintiffs decedent was killed by her former boyfriend. Id. at
* 1. The claim was that the City of Chicago violated her equal protection rights by failing
to protect domestic violence victims. Id. at *6. The court saw the claim as a "policy-or-
practice claim" of failing to have adequate policies in place. The court invoked Twombly
and Iqbal to establish the need for some specific facts: "The degree of specificity required
is not easily quantified . . . . The required level of factual specificity rises with the
complexity of the claim." Id. at *4 (citations omitted). The claim here was both complex
and "counterintuitive." Id. at *7. Allegations that the city "authorized, tolerated, and
institutionalized the practices and ratified the illegal conduct," "with deliberate, callous,
and conscious indifference," were mere "legal elements, . . . not factual allegations and as
such contribute nothing to the plausibility analysis . . . ... Id. at *6. The remaining
allegations failed to rise to the level needed to support what the court found to be
required-"selective withdrawal of police protection." Id.
Judge Hamilton's dissent shared skepticism that the plaintiff could establish the required
showing that the police department made a deliberate decision to withdraw protection for
victims of domestic violence because of an intentional animus against women. Id. at *8.
But, he said, the claim is legally viable. Id. According to Judge Hamilton, the case thus
presented the problem of faithfully honoring all the commitments a lower court has in
developing federal pleading doctrine. Id. at *10. The court must "do [its] best to apply the
law as stated in Iqbal." Id.
[But] it [is] also our responsibility to do our best to apply other Supreme Court
decisions involving pleading standards ... as well as the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . and the form pleadings that are part of the Federal Rules ....
Iqbal is in serious tension with these other decisions, rules, and forms, and the
Court's opinion fails to grapple with or resolve that tension. I do not believe it is
an exaggeration to say that these decisions, rules, and forms simply conflict with
Iqbal.
Id. In other words, the Court's interpretation of Rule 9(b), allowing general allegations of
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of mind, conflicts with the Rule.
[Vol. 90, 955968
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differences in approach.3 5  Differences existed before the Supreme
Court spoke and will remain no matter how often and clearly the
Court may speak again. For that matter, differences will persist even
if the Civil Rules Advisory Committee attempts to regularize pleading
standards, or the relationship between pleading and discovery, by
amending the Civil Rules.
III
MEASURING THE EFFECTS
Several sophisticated empirical attempts have been made to assess
the effects of Twombly and Iqbal by measuring the frequency and
outcome of motions to dismiss on the pleadings. The broadest study
was undertaken by Joe Cecil at the Federal Judicial Center at the
36
request of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. This study also
The full Iqbal opinion conflicts with other Supreme Court opinions. It conflicts with the
form complaints. "Unless one can plausibly explain away the tension[s] ... then 1qbal
conflicts with the Rules Enabling Act . . . and the prescribed process for amending the
Federal Rules ..... Id at *12. Beyond these flaws, "the fact/conclusion dichotomy is
highly subjective," "leading to judge-specific and case-specific differences in outcome that
confuse everyone involved." Id By invoking "'judicial experience and common sense,'
[Iqbal] invites the highly subjective and inconsistent results that have been observed." Id.
at * 13. Applying Twombly and Iqbal could easily have led to dismissing the complaint in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Dismissal in this case ran afoul of the
Court's no-heightened-pleading rulings, Rule 9(b), and the form complaints. "Perhaps the
Supreme Court majority intended Iqbal to work such a revolution in federal civil practice,
but if so, the Court failed to grapple with the conflicts and did not express any direct
rejection of these other governing sources of law." McCauley, 2011 WL 4975644, at *17.
35 A perceptive and careful review, covering more than the first four years after
Twombly, is provided by Andrea Kuperman, Review of Case Law Applying Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (July 26, 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal memo_07261 0.pdf.
36 JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf
/lookup/motioniqbal.pdfl$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO
DISMISS]; JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE
12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (2011), available at http://www.fjc
.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf [hereinafter CECIL ET
AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION]. The November report indicates that revisions will be
made to account for data missed in the original work, but also finds "no reason to believe
that inclusion of the missing orders will change the findings of our study of outcomes of
motions." CECIL ET AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION, supra, at 1.
The FJC study is appraised in Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An
Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss (Oct. 27, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1904134. Dr. Cecil and Professor Hoffman discussed the issues raised by Professor
Hoffman at the November 7-8, 2011, meeting of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
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summarizes some of the other studies.37 The FJC study counted Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss filed in the first ninety days after an
action was filed during two periods: October 2005 through June 2006,
and October 2009 through June 2010.38 Twenty-three federal
districts were included, accounting for fifty-one percent of all federal
civil cases filed during these periods.3 9  Some types of cases were
excluded.4 0 Motions based on insufficient pleading of the facts were
not distinguished from motions based on inadequacy of legal
theory.4' Nor was it possible to take account of possible changes in
pleading practices to include more factual allegations.42
The FJC studies are too rich in detail to adequately summarize
here. The broadest finding, made without adjustments, was that in all
cases (excluding prisoner and pro se cases), the rate of filing a motion
to dismiss went from 4.0% in 2005-2006 to 6.2% in 2009-2010.43
This is characterized as a 2.2% difference; it also could be described
as a 55.0% increase in the rate of filing. Different rates were found
for different categories of cases.4 Statistical adjustments
complicated the picture but confirmed increases in the rate of making
-45
motions.
Rulings on the motions came next. The broad findings were that in
all cases counted, motions were denied in 34.1% of the cases in 2006,
and 25.0% in 2010.46 Some or all of the relief requested by the
motion was granted in 65.9% of the 2006 cases and 75.0% of the
2010 cases, but there was a change in the frequency of granting with
leave to amend.4 7 From 2006 to 2010 grants with leave to amend
increased from 20.9% to 35.3%, while grants without leave to amend
fell from 45.0% to 39.7%.48 These figures were then subjected to
See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES FROM THE NOVEMBER 7-8, 2011,
MEETING, at 473-77 (2011).
37 CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS To DISMISS, supra note 36, at I n.4.
38 Id. at 5.
39 Id.
4
o Id. at 6.
41 See id. at 5-6.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id. at 8-9.
45 Id. at 21.
46 Id. at 14 tbl.4.
47 Id.
48 Id. The purpose of the November study was to determine what happens after a
motion is granted with leave to amend. "Our conclusions remain the same." CECIL ET
AL., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION, supra note 36, at 1.
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statistical adjustments to account for differences between the two
periods in the courts in which motions were filed (different courts
have quite different grant rates), the types of cases, and the presence
of an amended complaint (courts are more likely to grant without
leave to amend if the complaint has already been amended). After
adjustments, a statistically significant increase in the grant rate was
found only for financial instrument cases.4 9  "No statistically
significant increase in the likelihood that motions would be granted
was found for other types of cases.",s
The central findings naturally lead many readers to conclude that
more actions are being dismissed for failure to state a claim. What
else could follow from an increase in the frequency of motions
coupled with an unchanged rate of grants? Differences in the data
bases used, however, leave the FJC researchers agnostic on that score.
At the same time, the other studies they note suggest that in fact more
cases are being dismissed for failure to state a claim in the aftermath
of the Twombly and Iqbal decisions.
What may be made of this research and the many projects that are
sure to follow?
First, it seems clear that in deciding whether to file an action, a
plaintiff must recognize an increased probability of facing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. That is likely to increase cost and
delay. Some plaintiffs may abandon the enterprise for that reason
alone without regard to any calculation about the prospects of
prevailing on the motion after Twombly and Iqbal.
Second, it seems likely that more cases will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Quite apart from empirical counting of
motions and outcomes, increased dismissals seem likely unless lower
courts completely reject any heightened pleading standards or-by
some heroic calculation-potential plaintiffs manage to avoid filing
any of the actions that would not have been dismissed under earlier
notice pleading standards but would be dismissed now.
Third, as often observed, it is not possible to determine by docket
studies how many plaintiffs are deterred from filing actions by
counting the outcomes in cases that are filed. It seems safe to assume
that one consequence of heightened pleading is that, with or without
more careful prefiling investigation and preparation, some plaintiffs
abandon litigation before it is even commenced. Survey research
49 CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMiss, supra note 36, at 21.
50 Id. at 19.
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seeking subjective experience may provide some insight on this
possibility, but those who are displeased with the results will
complain that the results are no more than an accumulation of
anecdotes told by interested participants.
Fourth, there is no compelling indication that plaintiffs have
become victims of wholesale pleading slaughter.
Fifth, measuring long-term effects will require long-term patience.
It will be difficult to determine the point at which lower courts have
achieved as much convergence on stable pleading standards as will
occur without further outside influences. Lawyer practices are likely
to stabilize only after that, as plaintiffs adjust the level of prefiling
investigation and the amount of detail packed into complaints and
defendants adjust the frequency of challenges to complaints. Many
lawyers practiced heightened pleading long before Twombly and
Iqbal; as more lawyers take up some measure of heightened pleading,
and learn to sort cases better before filing, the measurable events will
shift-so will the events that survey research seeks. And changes in
the surrounding institutional framework will make measurement still
more difficult. Overall case loads, changes in the mix of actions,
gradual turnover in the ranks of federal judges, variations in pleading
standards and practice influenced by local state-court practices, and
countless other factors will generate some static.
Alas, accepting all of the studies and whatever conclusions they
may support does not much advance the inquiry. It is important,
indeed very important, to do such work as the FJC has done and as
others are doing. But counting outcomes does not evaluate outcomes.
The Supreme Court seems to believe that it may be a good thing to
dismiss at the pleading stage more actions than were being dismissed.
If the Court is right, it is a good thing to dismiss more actions and to
discourage filing actions that should be dismissed. And how do we
measure that? If the selection process is not perfect, how could it be?
How do we balance the increased dismissal of claims that do not
deserve dismissal against the increased dismissal of claims that do
deserve dismissal?
It may seem obvious, but the first step is to decide on the criterion
for deserved dismissal. Because pleading is a procedural matter, it is
fair to accept substantive law as a given. It might be argued that
9 There is room to suspect that occasionally a dismissal on the pleadings reflects a fear
that, absent dismissal, a claim will succeed on the merits of law that is distasteful to the
court. That does not seem a valid purpose for any procedural device. .
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dismissal is desirable whenever the claim would lose on the merits of
established law in a perfect procedural system. If that protects against
an unwarranted victory on the merits in our imperfect procedural
system, so much the better. That measure seems somehow wrong.
What is a procedural imperfection depends on the values of the
beholder. A jury's ability to decide in defiance of the law is a
common illustration that may account for the occasional muttered
admonitions that enhanced pleading standards may violate the
52Seventh Amendment. For want of anything more complex, then, let
us accept success on the merits in our actual court system as the
measure. Justice is denied by dismissal of the complaint in an action
that, if pursued to judgment on the merits, would result in judgment
for the plaintiff.
One side of the balance, then, is the cost of dismissing a claim that,
if allowed past the pleading threshold, would succeed on the merits.
Defeat of a right to recover is easily seen as denial of a right, and
rights must be taken seriously. But it would be extravagant to argue
that a heightened pleading standard must be rejected if it results in the
mistaken dismissal of even a single valid claim-a right-no matter
how great the marginal success in dismissing invalid claims.
Perhaps the importance of defeating meritless claims at the
threshold deserves some elaboration. Serious burdens are imposed on
a defendant by the simple act of commencing an action. Ordinarily
we do not compensate the successful defendant even for the out-of-
pocket costs, much less the distraction from ordinary affairs and the
emotional upheaval. These costs have grown as discovery has grown.
The Court's concern with discovery costs is not idle. These costs
should not be disregarded on the simple theory that generally
defendants are business enterprises, insured, or individually wealthy
enough to make suing them worthwhile. Even government
defendants deserve concern, despite their ability to spread the costs of
pursuing justice to the citizens at large. Not all plaintiffs are wronged
innocents, nor are all defendants wrongdoers.
52 A nice illustration is provided by Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin,
Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 399, 403 (2011): Twombly and Iqbal "are an implicit attack on the jury trial and, in
turn, on our democracy." "[T]he cases put the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial .
in jeopardy." Id. at 405.
A much more detailed argument is provided by Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MiNN. L. REV. 1851 (2008).
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These arguments point toward evaluating the ratio between valid
and invalid claims in the bundle of increased dismissals that result
from elevated pleading standards. If many invalid claims are
dismissed at the cost of dismissing no more than a few valid claims,
higher pleading standards may well be desirable. But the trick is to
guess at the ratio, and guesses are likely the. best we can do.
Empirical evaluation of even a few thousand cases by this measure,
chosen in an attempt to match across courts and categories of cases,
before and after Twombly and Iqbal, seems impossible. Even
recruiting neutral and sufficiently wise evaluators, and cross-checking
their evaluations, could be an insurmountable challenge. Guessing is
about as good as can be hoped for, and dispassionate guessing will be
hard to come by.
If empirical evaluation indeed falls short, inquiry may turn to
features of pleading standards that may invite questionable dismissals.
The Twombly and Iqbal opinions provide tempting targets.
"Plausibility" lies in the eye of the beholder. Mere possibility is not
enough. But the inference of liability need not be more probable than
all others, nor indeed as probable as the most probable competing
inference. 3 And, at least according to the Court in Twombly, there is
no need to show a probability that the plaintiff can actually prove
well-pleaded facts.54 The Court in Iqbal, on the other hand, attributes
to Twombly a test requiring "factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
53 A different rule is applied in cases governed by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, which requires that a claim of securities fraud "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). The Court has ruled that because "[tihe strength of an
inference cannot be decided in a vacuum," "[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling
as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323, 324 (2007). Tellabs was decided one month
after Twombly.
5 Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.
And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and "that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely."
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal repeats the rule that all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), but the malleability of the "well-pleaded" test leaves
manifest opportunities to disregard asserted "facts" as mere "conclusions."
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misconduct alleged."5 5 These words should be read to mean only that
the judge can find that a reasonable inference might be drawn, not
that the judge must actually find the inference "reasonable" in some
higher sense. But what sense is to be made of all this and the many
other opaque statements? The line between legal conclusions and
factual allegations also is not as clear as the Court may have it. The
bare allegation of negligence in Form 11 suffices, at least for now, but
it expresses a legal conclusion based on applying a standard of care to
unpleaded facts. Reliance on "judicial experience and common
sense" strikes many as an invitation to indulge the predispositions of
individual judges. And if not that, at least too easy an excuse for
clearing the docket of suspect cases to free judicial capacities for
other cases that, somehow, seem more deserving.
Another concern, frequently voiced, is that detailed pleading of fact
elements cannot be demanded when the defendant controls access to
the information needed to state the facts. This concern with
"asymmetric information" cases is reflected in Rule 11 (b)(3), which
allows pleading of factual contentions that "will likely have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery." It seems untoward to dismiss without
allowing some opportunity for discovery when the defendant alone
56knows facts crucial to the claim..
55 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
56 But an opinion in the Sixth Circuit reads Iqbal as compelling this result. New Albany
Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046 (6th Cir. 2011). The court affirmed
dismissal of a price-discrimination complaint for failure to plead facts that would support
an "indirect-purchaser" claim that the defendant manufacturer controlled the prices
charged by its exclusive distributor, the plaintiffs sole source of supply. Id. at 1048. The
court recognized that the defendants "are apparently the only entities with the information"
required. Id. at 1050. "Before Twombly and Iqbal, courts would probably have allowed
this case to proceed so that plaintiff could conduct discovery in order to gather the pricing
information that is solely retained within the accounting system of' the defendants. Id. at
1051.
[But] the language of Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be
conducted in cases such as this, even when the information needed . . . is solely
within the purview of the defendant or a third party, as it is here. . . . By
foreclosing discovery . . . the combined effect of Twombly and Iqbal require
plaintiff to have greater knowledge now of factual details in order to draft a
"plausible complaint."
Id. The court cited Professor Miller's article, perhaps showing the risk that protests about
potential misreadings may become self-fulfilling. Id. At any rate, the court made too
much of this sentence in Iqbal: "Because respondent's complaint is deficient under Rule 8,
he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1954). This sentence appears at the end of a segment that emphasizes the need to
implement the protections against litigation afforded by official immunity. Iqbal, 129 S.
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How these concerns play out in practice remains the central
question. Feckless dismissals are possible. Sophisticated and
restrained application of higher pleading standards also is possible.
Assessment of the outcome is likely to remain impressionistic, and to
be available only after still some years more of lower court
developments.
IV
THE RULEMAKING CHALLENGE
Put aside the challenge of measuring the actual impact of Twombly
and Iqbal, now or in the future, in manifold different categories of
cases. And put aside the challenge of assessing the impact, now or in
the future, whether good, bad, or neutral. Different challenges
confront the rulemaking process if it is concluded that the changes are
good, bad because they cause too many dismissals, bad because they
do not yet achieve enough dismissals, or neutral because in the end
the lower courts batter the law back to where it pretty much was
before the Court spoke.
Take first what may be the simplest conclusion, that the lower
courts, working the magic of the common-law process, achieve a
good or neutral balance across the board. Is there any point in
attempting to capture the new standards in revised Rule language?
Often it is valuable to capture established "best practices" in rule
language, making them uniform. Ideal rule language would clearly
express the present best practice, but leave room for cautious
continuing evolution as circumstances continue to change. The
drafting is not always easy. Possible illustrations are provided below.
It seems fair to assert that by far the largest portion of current
academic commentary believes that pleading standards have been
raised too high, at least some of the time for some types of cases.
Certainly Professor Miller holds this fear. If that is right, the drafting
task will be to find language that cuts back, either to some lower
pleading level that remains above the pre-Twombly practice or to the
practice that existed when Twombly was decided. Some of the bills
Ct. at 1953-54. Repeating the Court's skepticism about the ability of trial judges to
supervise carefully focused discoveiy, the Court said this in the preceding sentence: "[W]e
are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level
officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of
their duties." Id. at 1954. The admonition against discovery should be limited to this
context. For that matter, there is a difference between not being "entitled" to discovery
and having access to discovery in the court's discretion.
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aimed at superseding the Court's new venture into pleading standards
expressly attempted to restore pleading practices to the state of the
world on the day before Twombly was decided. At least two
difficulties must be surmounted in taking this approach. The first is
that pleading standards varied both within the Supreme Court's own
opinions and in lower court application. All that could be restored
would be an attitude and, perhaps, a process of continuing evolution
of the sort that actually led to Twombly and Iqbal. The second is
similar. Lower courts interpreting a rule crafted to restore the pre-
Twombly world would understand that the Supreme Court would
provide the authoritative interpretation of the new rule. If the Court
had adopted the new rule in the regular course of the Enabling Act,
bowing to a considered recommendation that pleading standards had
been raised too high, its interpretation would no doubt choose words
different from those used in Twombly and Iqbal. But the Court could
easily choose from the more demanding precedents, diminishing the
new rule's effect. And if the new rule was adopted by direct
congressional intervention, the Court might interpret it more
grudgingly still.
Responses to the concern that pleading standards have been raised
too high can be made indirectly, without revising any of the pleading
rules. The most obvious alternatives would address the problem of
asymmetrical information by providing some form of discovery in aid
of pleading. Possible models are described below.
As yet there are few suggestions that lower courts have not gone as
far as should be in raising pleading standards, whether as measured by
the Court's wishes in Twombly and Iqbal or as measured by a more
pressing need for reform than the Court recognized. But it is
important to hold open all possible diagnoses of developing practice.
Any attempt to raise pleading standards would stir vigorous
resistance. The resistance would be in large part political in a true
sense, advancing the public and private needs to ensure effective
enforcement of the social and regulatory policies embodied in the
5 An example is the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. §
3(a) (2010): "Except as expressly provided by an Act of Congress enacted before, on, or
after the date of enactment of this Act . . . or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure effective on or after that date, the law governing a dismissal, striking, or
judgment described under subsection (b) shall be in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in decisions
issued before May 20, 2007." Subsection (b) described "dismissal or striking of all or any
part of a pleading containing a claim for failure to state a claim, indefiniteness, or
insufficiency, or a judgment on the pleadings."
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laws that might be under-enforced. Careful drafting would do little to
appease the resistance-if anything, clearly heightened standards
could augment resistance. The drafting options could focus on Rule
8, seeking generally higher standards but perhaps allowing a few
exceptions for categories of claims to be governed by more relaxed
standards. Or the particular pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) might
be expanded, either by adding to the categories listed in Rule 9(b) or
by adopting a new multipart rule listing a lengthy catalogue of claims
(and perhaps defenses). Singling out particular substantive categories
for heightened pleading would require detailed and sensitive
substantive knowledge. And arguments would be made that
distinctions among claims are inappropriate, either as a general matter
of "transsubstantivity" or as a departure from the command that
Enabling Act "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."5 8
Before turning to a sample of drafting approaches, the example of
Form 11 bears repeating. Form 11-Form 9 before the Style
Project-is a complaint for negligence. The operative parts are
simple: "on date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically
injured . . . ." The acts constituting negligence are nowhere
described. Causation is pleaded casually: "as a result." A footnote in
the Twombly opinion seems to find this form sufficient, observing that
"[a] defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact pattern
laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer. . . ."59 The cogency
of Form 11 rests not only on simplicity. Familiarity is also important.
Motor vehicle accidents are frequently litigated. The parties know
exactly how to go about preparing the case. They can focus discovery
with little difficulty, and if they do not the court should have little
difficulty doing it for them.
But what if a Form 11 complaint involves a more complicated legal
claim? What if the accident occurs in a no-fault state: should the
plaintiff be required to plead facts that take the plaintiff out of the no-
fault regime and into negligence liability? Or what if the claim is
against the vehicle's manufacturer: does it suffice to allege generally
that the design was unreasonably unsafe (negligent)? Suppose the
claim is that the manufacturer had sufficient notice of similar events
to create a reasonable-care duty to launch a recall campaign? Or,
58 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
59 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10.
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shifting arenas, the claim is for negligent misrepresentations: could it
suffice to allege only that at a specified time and place the defendant
made negligent misrepresentations that the plaintiff relied upon to his
injury? Or, to take a truly bold claim, how much need be alleged to
go forward with a claim that the SEC was negligent in failing to
uncover and stop a massive Ponzi scheme?60 The idea that a few
words in a pleading rule can cover all negligence claims with
precision, dispensing with any need for elaboration in application, is
doomed to fail. Multiplying this simple example across the full range
of claims that may be brought to a federal court shows the need for
flexible generality in the pleading rules. At some point, the rules will
have to rely on wise application in response to specific cases,
whatever the risks of invoking "judicial experience and common
sense."
What follows is, pretty much without change, material that was
included in the agenda materials for the April 4-5, 2011, meeting of
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.61 The aim was to list some of
the more obvious alternatives, whether broad avenues or narrow
paths. The rule language used to illustrate some of the alternatives is
only that-illustration that gives a clearer focus for inquiry, not
carefully refined drafting.
The controlling caution must be repeated. None of these sketches
reflects Committee deliberation, much less choice. They are heuristic
in purpose, prepared to remind the Committee of choices that may be
plausible, however far below the threshold of probable.
A. Pleading: Claim
An obvious place to begin is with Rule 8(a)(2). Even if some need
appears to propose rule amendments, Rule 8 must be approached
carefully. No matter what words might be chosen, the message would
be ambiguous in ways that a committee note could not cure. Even if
it were announced that the new language was intended to enshrine
exactly the meaning of the Twombly and Iqbal opinions as elaborated
by the lower courts, disputes would remain as to just what that
meaning might be. If instead the purpose were to redirect in some
way the paths taken by the lower courts, greater uncertainty-and
60 This was the claim in Molchatsky v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), appeal docketed, No. 11-2510 (2d Cir. June 21, 2011).
61 ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE APRIL 4-5,2011,
MEETING, at 173-80 (2011).
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likely some real confusion-would follow. The manifest
vulnerabilities of almost any Rule 8 proposal would support cogent
protests by any group that feared adverse effects, and there might be
many such groups. Still, Rule 8 must hold a high place on any agenda
for addressing pleading standards.
Restore What Never Was: Some of the reactions to the Twombly
decision seem to ask for restoration of the dictum in Conley v. Gibson
that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state claim only if "it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." The plea for
restoration in turn seems to ask that these words be taken literally.
Most courts, at least, did not take the literal meaning. But Rule 8
might be redrafted in an attempt to restore a standard that never was:
"a short and plain statement giving notice of the claim."
Restore What Was: A more realistic approach might attempt to
restore pleading practice as it was on May 20, 2007, the day before
the Twombly decision. This approach is more realistic only if it is
accepted that there can be no precise definition of the practice in place
at the time Twombly was decided. The idea would be to "go back to
doing whatever it was you were doing, and continue to develop
pleading practice without regard to anything in the Twombly or Iqbal
decisions that might point you in a different direction." Even then it
is difficult to believe that lower courts, recalling the Twombly and
Iqbal opinions, could in fact recreate whatever they would have done
had those cases never gone to the Supreme Court. But the attempt
could be made. Two simple drafting possibilities are:
"a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the pleader
is may be entitled to relief."
"a short and plain statement of the claim-regardless of its
nonconclusory plausibility-showing. . . ." Kevin M. Clermont &
Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 859 n.135 (2010).
A less reverent approach might be to republish present Rule
8(a)(2), with a committee note disavowing plausibility, context,
judicial experience, and common sense. Explaining that it was
messy, all those things counted, but it doesn't do to say so.
"Notice plus ": The ABA Section of Litigation paper, "Civil
Procedure in the 21st Century: Some Proposals" (April 24, 2010),
proposes this as a mid-ground between their perception of Twombly-
Iqbal standards and the notice pleading practice that prevailed on May
20, 2007:
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"A complaint shall allege facts based on knowledge or on
information and belief that, along with reasonable inferences from
those factual allegations, taken as true, set forth the elements
necessary to sustain recovery."
Twombly-Iqbal in Rule Speak: Another approach would reflect
basic agreement that the time had come to raise pleading standards to
some extent-that the Court was right to make the attempt and also
right to express the new approach in capacious language leaving the
way open for lower court improvisation on the way to hammering out
new standards through a common-law process. Although the
opinions are written as opinions, not in an attempt to mimic rule
language, some of the key words could be absorbed into Rule 8.
These are among the possibilities:
"a short and plain statement showing a plausible claim for relief'
"a short and plain statement of facts and context showing the
pleader is entitled to relief'
"a statement of non-conclusional facts, .direct or inferential,
showing the pleader is entitled to relief'
"a short and plain non-conclusory statement showing the pleader is
entitled to relief'
"a slrt and plain statement of a transaction or occurrence showing
"a short and plain statement of acts or events showing. . .
"a short and plain non-conclusory statement of grounds gyfficient to
provide notice of (a) the claim and (b) the relief sought"
"a short and plain statement, made with particularity, of all material
facts known to the pleading party that support the claim creating a
reasonable inference that the pleader is plausibly entitled to relief,"
defining "material fact" as "one that is necessary to the claim and
without which it could not be supported." eh
62 An early draft of Rule 8(a)(2) required a "statement of the acts and occurrences upon
which the plaintiff bases his claim or claims for relief." Without "showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief," this would be quite relaxed.
63 This is the proposal of the New York State Bar Association Special Committee on
Pleading Standards in Federal Litigation. Letter from Samuel F. Abernethy, Esq., to The
Honorable Mark R. Kravitz (July 13, 2010) (on file with author). Bringing "notice" into
rule text is evocative, perhaps too evocative-it may imply a more general relaxation of
pleading standards than actually existed before Twombly and Iqbal.
64 This is the proposal of Lawyers for Civil Justice, DRI, the Federation of Defense &
Corporate Counsel, and the International Association of Defense Counsel.
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More than Twombly-Iqbal:
"The party that bears the burden of proof with respect to any claim
or affirmative defense must plead with particularity all material
facts that are known to that party that support that claim or
affirmative defense and each remedy sought, including any known
monetary damages. A material fact is one that is essential to the
claim or defense and without which it could not be supported. As to
facts that are pleaded on information and belief, the pleading grty
must set forth in detail the basis for the information and belief."
Variations on Facts: Although the label is likely to prove
controversial, Rule 8 could be pushed in the direction of something
that could be called "fact pleading." The second of the three
variations shown here approaches Code pleading; the first and third
are designed to make it easier to disclaim any intent to revive
indeterminate distinctions between "fact," "ultimate fact," and
"evidence."
"a short and plain statement of facts showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief'
"a short and plain statement of facts constituting the claim"
"a short and plain statement of the claim, including facts showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief'
Elements Pleading: Occasionally it is suggested that a pleader
should be required to plead the elements of the claim: "a short and
plain statement of the elements of the claim."
Prefiling Pleading: Alan Morrison's Duke Conference paper
proposes an approach to situations in which the defendant has control
of fact information required to state a claim.66 Iqbal as would-be
plaintiff, for example, could submit a letter or draft complaint to the
defendants alleging that they ordered the challenged practices. If the
defendants do not supply information in their control showing how
the policies were established, they would be barred from challenging
the complaint for failure to allege specifically facts connecting them
to the orders. A mere blanket denial would not do, because there is
likely to be a paper or e-mail trail. But if the defendants present
65 INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (IAALS),
21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: PILOT PROJECT
RULES, 3 (2009) (Rule 2.1).
66 See Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil
Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993 (2012). An earlier version of this article was
presented at the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, Duke Law School, May 10-11,
2010.
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evidence countering the claims, then the plaintiff must present "some
basis ... to avoid dismissal, rather like a mini summary judgment."
Reverse Pleading Burdens: Professor Miller suggests that if the
plaintiff alleges the inaccessibility of critical information and
"articulates a reasonable basis for the information's existence and the
defendant's control over it . . . it might be reasonable to reverse the
pleading burden and require the defendant to make the needed
material available to the plaintiff along with whatever explanation it
,,67 68thinks appropriate. The court could allow further discovery.
Appellate Review: Professor Miller asks whether the "subjective
appraisals" that inhere in "judicial experience and common sense"
will lead to diluted appellate review.69 Need the rules be amended to
ensure continued de novo review of dismissals for failure to state a
claim?
B. Rule 9(b)
From time to time thought has been given to adopting "heightened
pleading" statidards for specific kinds of claims, expanding the Rule
9(b) requirement that "fraud or mistake" be stated "with
particularity." (Rule 9(c) also requires that a party denying that "a
condition precedent has occurred or been performed . .. must do so
with particularity.") One reason to hesitate has been concern that
picking out specific claims might seem to imply substantive choices.
Requiring greater fact information to allow a claim past the Rule
12(b)(6) threshold into the heavenly fields of discovery might seem to
reflect a judgment about the relative desirability of enforcing that kind
of claim. Although this concern must be taken seriously, there are
powerful arguments that the purpose is as much procedural as the
purpose of original Rule 9(b). (The original procedural purpose of
Rule 9(b) may not be entirely clear, but any obscurity may bolster the
argument that some blend of real-world procedural concern with
substantive concerns is proper under the Enabling Act.)
Greater difficulty might arise in deciding just which claims to
embrace in heightened pleading standards. Broad informal
consultation might establish a tentative list. Actual choices for
development might be supported by miniconferences or a general
67 Miller, supra note 4, at 110.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 34-36.
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request for public comment before any specific rule or set of rules is
proposed.
Implementation by drafting would be influenced by the direction
taken. If the revised rule simply expanded the categories of claims
that must be stated "with particularity," the main challenge would be
finding a way to identify the claims. Would it suffice to list
"antitrust" claims, or should a more specific list of statutes be
adopted? Some categories might be relatively easy to specify-civil
RICO would be an example. But what of "environmental" claims-
statutory, common-law (e~g., nuisance), or perhaps administrative?
"Institutional reform"? Even the familiar example of claims likely to
encounter an immunity defense could prove tricky; qualified or
absolute official immunity to federal-law claims might be clear
enough, but what of parallel immunities to state-law claims?
Sovereign immunity, domestic or foreign? More exotic immunities?
Finally, a quite different Rule 9(b) question may be found in the
Iqbal opinion. Rule 9(b) provides that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally."
The Court rejected the argument that this provision makes adequate a
bare allegation of "intent." "' [G]enerally' is a relative term. . . . It
does not give . . . license to evade the less rigid-though still
operative-strictures of Rule 8.,,70 The task of pleading greater
supporting detail for an allegation of intent is daunting, and is
encountered frequently. Discrimination claims provide a common
example. This question may deserve close attention.n
C. Reverse Rule 9(b): Special Relaxed Pleading Rules
Rather than expand the categories of claims that must be pleaded
with particularity, whether in Rule 9(b) or in new rules, a reverse
approach might be taken. Pleading standards could be raised for most
claims, retaining relaxed notice pleading for specified claims.
Individual discrimination (at least in employment: what of "class-of-
one" equal protection claims?), intent to discriminate, "civil rights,"
claims based on facts inferred from circumstance, and others could be
listed. One problem will be finding categories that can be kept within
70 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
71 Judge Hamilton's dissent in McCauley v. City of Chicago, No. 09-3561, 2011 WL
4975644, at *10 (7th Cir. Oct. 20, 2011), is more direct: "Iqbal's reasoning and holding
conflict with Rule 9(b) . . . ." "The Court's statement about Rule 9(b) that 'generally" is
a relative term' does not solve the problem or give practical guidance to district courts."
Id. at *11.
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meaningful bounds-"civil rights" is a pretty loose concept. It would
be difficult to draft in terms that focus directly on information
asymmetry, on "favored" claims, or "real people" claims. It would be
possible to adopt an express pro se rule-but that might tempt
lawyers to suggest a limited advising role at the beginning, to be
followed by explicit representation later on. And past discussions
have generally concluded that it is better to hold pro se parties to
some semblance of the general pleading rules, perhaps with help from
local forms and often with help from sympathetic judges.
D. Official Immunity
The recurring problem of official immunity pleading is difficult to
address by focusing on the complaint. Perhaps the most feasible
approach would be to require pleading with particularity whenever an
individual-capacity claim is brought against a "public officer or
employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission
occurring in connection with duties performed on a public employer's
behalf"
An alternative approach would call for a reply, in the practice made
famous by the Fifth Circuit. The rule might be framed as a Rule
9(b)(2), or as a Rule 7(a)(8), or something still different. The major
difficulty with the Rule 7(a)(8) approach might be that plaintiffs
would often overlook it. But it would be easy to draft if the reply is
optional: "(8) a reply to an official immunity defense." If the reply is
mandatory, there would be a cross-reference in Rule 7(a)(7), and a
new Rule 9(b)(2): "(2) Reply to [Official] Immunity Defense. If a
defense of [official] immunity is made [to a claim], the claimant must
respond by a reply that states with particularity the circumstances that
defeat immunity." "Official" is placed in brackets to indicate one of
the drafting dilemmas-what sorts of immunity should be covered?
Should the rule be framed explicitly in teims of an individual-capacity
claim against a public officer or employee, etc.? "Official" itself
would lead to such questions as Eleventh Amendment "immunity,"
claims against foreign sovereigns, and various immunities under state
law. Without "official," all sorts of questions would arise: workers'
compensation immunity? Charitable immunity, if it exists anywhere?
Family immunities, if they exist anywhere? Even such things as
immunity from attachment or the like?
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E. Rule 12(d)
Rule 12(d) might serve better than Rule 56 as the location for a rule
allowing a party opposing a claim to make what in effect is a
preliminary motion for summary judgment. The motion would rely
on matters outside the pleadings to challenge facts poorly pleaded,
facts omitted, and perhaps facts "well pleaded." The pleader would
have an opportunity for discovery similar to that provided by Rule 56
before responding to the motion. A rough draft:
(D) PRELIMINARY SUMMARY JUDGMENT. A party [opposing a
claim] may combine a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c)
with a preliminary motion for summary judgment under Rule
56. The movant may show there is no genuine dispute as to
material facts that are required to support the claim or that
defeat the claim. The court must allow the non-movant a
reasonable opportunity for discovery on the facts asserted by
the movant before ruling on the motion.
(It would be possible to carry forward some version of present Rule
12(d), which gives the court the choice between treating the pleadings
motion as one for summary judgment by undertaking to consider the
"matters outside the pleading." Or discretion to refuse to allow a
premature Rule 56 motion could be expressed directly. The
advantage of treating it as a Rule 56 motion is to pick up the full Rule
56 procedure from the beginning. Less elliptical drafting also may be
desirable, but might encounter the reluctance to refer directly to the
Rule 56 moving burdens that shaped new Rule 56.)
F. Rule 12(e)
We might consider reviving earlier Rule 12(e) proposals. The rule
could focus on directing a more definite statement for the purpose of
facilitating pretrial management, including initially limited discovery
to support more precise pleading. Professor Miller describes this as a
"Motion to Particularize a Claim for Relief," allowing a plaintiff to
anticipate a motion to dismiss by moving for "plausibility
discovery." 7 2
G. Rule 12(b): Tied to Discovery
A great part of the dismay engendered by the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions arises from concerns about "information asymmetry." The
concerns tend to focus on categories of claims-product liability,
72 Miller, supra note 4, at 112-14.
986 [Vol. 90, 955
HeinOnline  -- 90 Or. L. Rev. 986 2011-2012
King Arthur Confronts Twlqy Pleading
some forms of employment discrimination, conspiracy, and so on.
Plaintiffs, it is argued, typically lack access to information controlled
by defendants and necessary to satisfy higher pleading standards. The
need to support adequate pleading by discovery to elicit information
controlled by the defendant might be built into Rule 12. The
provision could focus only on 12(b)(6). Discovery may be needed to
respond to other 12(b) motions, but it may be better to leave that to
present practice. Discovery also may be needed to respond to a
motion under Rule 12(c) or (f). The idea would be to allow-
probably not require-the court to permit discovery for the purpose of
improving the pleading before ruling on the motion.
Placing this approach in Rule 12 will prove awkward. The
enumeration of Rule 12(b) motions as (1) through (7) is more a list
than a sequence of paragraphs. The best approach might be to add a
new subdivision after Rule 12(f)-subdivisions (g) and (h) do not
have the same sacred identification as 12(b)(6) or even 12(c), and
subdivision (i) was created in 2007 by the Style Project. So a new
Rule 12(g) might look something like this:
"(g) Discovery in Aid ofPleading. Before ruling on a motion under
Rule 12(b), (c), or (f), the court may allow discovery [under Rules
26 through 37 {and 45}] to aid [more detailed
pleading][amendment of the pleading]."
H. Rule 27.1: Discovery in Aid ofPleading
Discovery in aid of pleading might be fit into Rule 26, but Rule 26
is already too long. It could be fit into present Rule 27, but
perpetuation of testimony is a distinct problem and drafting would
likely be more complicated. A new Rule 27.1 may be the simplest
approach.
The first question will be whether to provide for discovery before
filing an action. There are several state-law models. In addition, the
ACTL/IAALS Pilot Project Rules include a detailed provision, set out
in the Appendix, that provides a helpful illustration. The most
persuasive reason to move in this direction may involve the plaintiff
who does not know the identity of the defendant-which officer in a
large police department shot the plaintiffs decedent? Which
company made the exploding dynamite cap? Discovery could be
limited by requiring showings that the plaintiff has exhausted
reasonable alternatives for finding the information, the plaintiff can
state all elements of a claim apart from identifying the defendant, and
there are good reasons to impose the burdens of discovery on the
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person asked for the information. This possibility has been twice
suggested during earlier rounds of discovery work, and was quickly
rejected each time. It may not prove any more popular now, but
reconsideration may be appropriate if elevated pleading requirements
create a risk that valid claims will frequently be defeated for lack of
access to information controlled by the defendant. (The ABA 21st
Century Proposals would allow pre-complaint discovery only to
determine the identity of the defendant.)
An alternative is to provide discovery in aid of framing a claim
after an action is commenced by filing a complaint. Discovery might
be made available by allowing the plaintiff to file an incomplete
complaint, specifically designating items on which discovery will be
sought to support better-informed pleading. The defendant could
respond by providing information without waiting for discovery, by
agreeing to discovery, or by opposing discovery for stated reasons.
Or discovery might be provided only after a motion challenging the
claim (or defense). This approach comes closest to something that
might be fit into Rule 26, perhaps with a cross-reference in Rule 12:
the point would be to emphasize the authority to limit discovery to
specific matters needed to support "better" pleading.
The ABA proposals include:
"The court may permit focused post-complaint discovery in those
limited cases where, because of the nature of the case, the plaintiff
does not have access to sufficient information to satisfy the"
pleading standard.
Examples are antitrust cases and discrimination cases where intent is
an element of the claim.
I. Initial Disclosure
Pleading and discovery may overlap in a different way. Early
disclosure of facts might be accomplished immediately after the
papers that are called "pleadings," by obligations of unilateral
disclosure. This approach might address the concerns that underlie
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions by providing a secure foundation for
guiding or eliminating discovery, while reducing fears that evaluation
of "plausibility" in light of "judicial experience and common sense"
will devolve into poorly supported speculation about the "facts" that
have been pleaded and the inferences that can be drawn from them.
The Duke Conference reflected competing views on present Rule
26(a)(1) initial disclosures. One view is that they are useless.
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Another is that they are helpful. A third is that they could become
useful if the more searching 1993 version were restored, requiring
disclosure of information that a party hopes will not be used as well
as information it may use.
J. Pleading in Response
It will be difficult to improve on the drafting of Rule 8(b) to meet
the frequent complaints that defendants deny too much, too casually.
Rule 8(b)(2) requires that a denial fairly respond to the substance of
the allegation. Rule 8(b)(3) requires that a party that does not intend
to deny all allegations "must either specifically deny designated
allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted."
Rule 8(b)(4) requires that a party admit the part of an allegation that is
true and deny the rest. If a true fact is pleaded with characterizations,
adverbs, or adjectives, the answer must admit the fact even while
denying the characterization, adverbs, or adjectives. Rule 11 enforces
this duty; indeed the safe-harbor provision, 11 (c)(2), specifically
includes defenses and denials. The safe harbor may make it difficult
to make much use of Rule 11 in this context, but amendment of Rule
11 may not be a satisfactory approach.
Defendants defend their practices by arguing that plaintiffs cause
the problem by overpleading and by violating the separate-statement
requirement of Rule 10(b). In effect, they assert it is unfair to impose
on defendants the work of picking through the mess made by sloppy
pleading. Again, it will be difficult to draft a satisfactory rule to
promote clearer pleading. Anything done to perpetuate the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions may actually make this problem more difficult.
So: Is there anything reasonable to be done? One comment in the
ABA survey suggested whatever Rule 8(a) requires, good fact
pleading could be useful as a request for admissions, and laments that
defendants do not respond as Rule 8(b) requires. That sounds good.
But is it possible to get there?
K Pleading Affirmative Defenses
Plaintiffs complain that defendants thoughtlessly add long lists of
affirmative defenses to their answers, providing nothing more than the
words that identify the theory. Something more could be required.
Two examples from present Rule 8(c) illustrate the range of
pleading possibilities. A defendant may plead comparative
negligence-is there any reason to require greater detail than we
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require of a plaintiff pleading negligence? Or a defendant may plead
laches-should it not have to plead something to support the elements
of unreasonable delay and actual prejudice in defending?
The range of desirable pleading practices may not be as broad as it
is for complaints, but it is not much narrower. If anything is to be
done, it may be better to avoid any attempt to provide specific
pleading directions for specific affirmative defenses. There are far
too many affirmative defenses, most of them not listed in Rule 8(c).
One illustration can invoke all of the possible variations in
[re]drafting Rule 8(a)(2):
"In responding to a pleading, a party must affiimatively state in
short and plain terms any avoidance or affirmative defense. . .
CONCLUSION
The sketches set out in Part IV provide an incomplete overview of
the many questions that flow from the Twombly and Iqbal opinions.
Measuring the height of the pleading thresholds that emerge from
lower-court development will be challenging in itself. No yardstick
or thermometer exists to calibrate precise scales of pleading precision.
Impressionistic assessments will be made, but they will vary with the
perspectives of the assessors. And it seems unlikely that thresholds
will be set at the same height across the wide range of substantive
claims that come before the federal courts. But it remains possible to
make rough measurements. The most likely guess is that pleading
thresholds will be raised, at least for many categories of actions.
Then the hard work begins. Raising pleading standards may be
good, bad, or neutral. "Bad" may mean standards that are too high or
not yet high enough. Any rules prescription will depend on the
diagnosis and no diagnosis can be certain. But certainty is not
required in the rules business. Serious problems demand attention,
and get it. Pleading problems can be addressed directly by pleading
rules. They also can be addressed by new modes of integrating
pleading with opportunities for discovery. Summary judgment also
might be integrated more closely with pleading and discovery
practice, facilitating access to vital sources of information while
protecting against the burdens of full-blown discovery before an early
determination whether the action should proceed to the stage of full
discovery and beyond. The Civil Rules Committee can properly take
990 [Vol. 90, 955
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up arms in response to Professor Miller's call.7  It remains to be
decided whether, armed; the Committee should engage in combat.
73 See supra note 8.
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ACTL/IAALS Pilot Project Rules7 4
Rule Three: Precomplaint Discovery
3.1 On motion by a proposed plaintiff with notice to the proposed
defendant and opportunity to be heard, a proposed plaintiff may
obtain precomplaint discovery upon the court's determination, after
hearing, that:
a. the moving party cannot prepare a legally sufficient
complaint in the absence of the information sought by the
discovery;
b. the moving party has probable cause to believe that the
information sought by the discovery will enable preparation
of a legally sufficient complaint;
c. the moving party has probable cause to believe that the
information sought is in the possession of the person or entity
from which it is sought;
d. the proposed discovery is narrowly tailored to minimize
expense and inconvenience; And
e. the moving party's need for the discovery outweighs the
burden and expense to other persons and entities.
3.2 The court may grant a motion for precomplaint discovery
directed to a nonparty pursuant to PPR 3.1. Advance notice to the
nonparty is not required, but the nonparty's ability to file a motion to
quash shall be preserved.
3.3 If the court grants a motion for precomplaint discovery, the court
may impose limitations and conditions, including provisions for the
allocation of costs and attorneys' fees, on the scope and other terms of
discovery.
74 IAALS, supra note 65, at 4.
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